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I. INTRODUCTION
A. THE ROLES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENTAL AND CORPORATE
ACTORS IN THE GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE DEBATE
N the current debate over "global climate change,"' American gov-
ernmental and corporate actors are both prominent and controver-
sial. This is because, together, they have brought to the debate: (1)
the largest producer of "anthropogenic" (human-induced) "green house
gases ' 2 (GHGs), critical elements in the "global warming ' 3 process; (2)
the pre-eminent "bad boy" in the multilateral law-making process ad-
dressing climate change issues;4 and (3) the global superpower, with the
capability, if not the duty, to provide leadership. 5
1. See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development Framework
Convention on Climate Change, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992) [hereinafter FCCCJ (climate change
means a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that
alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate
variability observed over comparable time periods). INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, Climate 2001: The Science of Climate Change Technical Summary
(2001) [hereinafter Science of Climate Change]. "[A]ny change in climate over time,
whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity."
2. See FCCC, supra note 1, art. 1(5), providing as follows: "'Greenhouse gases'
means those gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic, that
absorb and re-emit infrared radiation." See also UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK ON CLI-
MATE CHANGES, Kyoto Protocol, Annex A, FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add. 1, (listing, as Green-
house gases: Carbon dioxide, Methane, Nitrous oxide, Hydrofluorocarbons,
Perfluorocarbons, and Sulphur hexafluoride).
3. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW SCIENCE
AND POLICY 1247 (3d ed. 2000), defining "global warming": "An increase in worldwide
temperature due to increased atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and other
gases that contribute to the greenhouse effect." See infra Section 11 (A) of this article for
a fuller description of the process by which GHGs contribute to global warming, which is
said to be a causative element in global climate change.
4. Reluctance to cooperate in the climate change law-making process, combined with
its status as the largest GHG emitter, has led other nations to label the U.S. a "bad boy."
See Testimony of Lawrence Chimerine, Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, Eco-
nomic Strategy Institute, before the International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Pro-
motion Subcommittee, Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Oct. 9, 1997). ("European
efforts to caricature the United States as the bad boy of global climate change are mis-
guided..."). Although the pre-eminent bad boy, the U.S. has not always been the only
one. See Peter Morton, Clinton's Gas Emissions Plan Attacked from All Sides, THE FINAN-
CIAL POST, October 23, 1997, p. 12. ("Canada, Japan and the U.S. are being painted as the
environmental bad boys after a United Nations report said the three countries contributed
85% of gas emitted by major industrialized countries.") But now that Japan and Canada
joined 176 other nations in a July 23, 2001 Conference of the Parties (COP6) agreement to
implement the Kyoto Protocol, the U.S. is the sole remaining bad boy. UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan decision 5/
CP6, Oct. 23, 2001; Isolated on Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2001.
5. See, e.g., Press Release, Lieberman, McCain Call for Climate Change Legislation
(Aug. 3, 2001, (available at http://lieberman.senate.gov/-lieberman/press/01/08/2001803920.
html), in which U.S. Senators Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) and John McCain (R-AZ) "called
for development of an economy-wide cap-and-trade system to control emissions of green-
house gases .... One of many reactions around the world to President Bush's rejection
of the Kyoto Protocol, the proposal offered by the senators seeks to "'unleash the power of
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Another pertinent characteristic of these two sectors in this debate is
the often concurrent and complementary nature of their positions. On
this point, there is no better example of such accord than the period thus
far of the current presidential administration: George Walker Bush's as-
cent to the American presidency has greatly enhanced the core of shared
governmental and corporate attitudes about climate change. 6 Indeed,
that President Bush and Vice-President Cheney are former petroleum
industry executives made it unremarkable that the administration ap-
proached the subject initially with a sense of reserve long held in the cor-
porate community.7 And even as the positions of the two leaders
evolved, it was not surprising that they would propose solutions reflecting
the traditional emphases of business. 8 Reserve and economic considera-
tions, therefore, have animated the President's actions and reactions, in-
cluding his controversial decision to reject as "fatally flawed," the 1997
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change. 9
It is largely because of the power and the centrality of the governmen-
tal and corporate actors that the present debate concerns itself so greatly
with these themes. In fact, the two sectors constitute an imposing force
that threatens to continue to dominate-if not prevail-in the ongoing
battle to define climate change policy.
[the] market to drive the United States back into its leadership position in the international
fight against global warming."'
6. See, e.g., Robert M. Sussman, A Rocky Start. Bush's Environmental Policy,
TRENDS, July/August 2001, at 5 (noting how "industry groups and conservative Republi-
cans praised" the president's decisions to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol and to refuse
to introduce mandatory emission reductions for carbon dioxide. Nevertheless, attitudes
within the two communities are not monolithic. Perhaps the best example was the failed
effort of U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Christine Todd Whitman
in trying to convince President Bush to adopt a more environmentally protective position
on climate change). See ROGER W. FINDLEY ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW iii (5th ed.
Supp. 2001) ("The first six months of the Bush Administration have raised concern about
the direction of the President's environmental policies .... On numerous occasions, the
president has reversed or undermined the public statements of his EPA administrator, for-
mer Governor Christine Todd Whitman.") Also, as this article will discuss, a growing num-
ber of enterprises have begun to implement pro-active, progressive business policies on
climate change.
7. See DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMMITTEE, GOP: Grand Oil Party, at 9 (May 16,
2001). "Bush is a big oil man from big oil country with lots of big oil friends. From the
President on down, the West Wing is filled with former big oil executives." The report thus
asserts that "the Bush energy plan that has been developed in secret is pro-drilling, pro-
nuclear, anti-consumer, and anti-environment." Id. at 1.
8. See infra Sections III (A), (B) of this article.
9. See Press Release, Office of the White House, Remarks by the President on Global
Climate Change (June 11, 2001) (available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/06/20010611-2.html) [hereinafter Remarks] ("The Kyoto Protocol was fatally flawed
in fundamental ways."). See also infra Section II(B) of this article, discussing the evolution
of the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol; and infra Sections III(A) and (B), discussing the
positions taken by the various interested parties.
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B. THE IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LEADERSHIP
This article explores the role of the powerful U.S. corporate commu-
nity in the global climate change debate. The discussion proceeds with a
focus on the concept of "corporate governance." In doing so, the objec-
tive here is to develop ideas about American corporate participation in
this debate through a medium well-accepted in that community as a
means of self-analysis, evaluation, planning, vision-seeking, and
implementation.10
The underlying thesis of this article is that the stakes in the global cli-
mate change debate are too high not to have the American corporate
community engaged in both corporate and global governance. Granted,
the United States has rejected the Kyoto Protocol, and it may not accept
that measure any time soon.1' Accordingly, the corporate community
could easily take this rejection and use it, along with its well-known ob-
jections to the protocol, to fight, without serious inquiry, for maintenance
of the status quo. Or, corporate America could even remain silent. But
the risks here are too great for such approaches.
Indeed, even if climate change proves not to be the threat that some
claim it will be, an entire international legal, political and economic struc-
ture is now being created. This structure will likely affect in a substantial
way the global economic environment. And, notwithstanding the U.S. re-
jection of it, the American-based transnational corporation will surely
operate in many of the vast number of nations that reaffirmed (in Bonn
in July, 2001, and in Marrakech in November, 2001) their participation in
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the
related Kyoto Protocol. 12 In the face of these dynamics alone-not to
mention the prospect that climate change could truly be a threat-the
American corporate community must lead, both in its own interest and in
the interest of the world community that it serves.
Sections II and III set out background matter, including underlying sci-
entific concepts, the politics of the debate over the creation, signing and
implementation of the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, as well as a
description of the economic and energy policy considerations around cli-
mate change.
Section IV addresses in particular the difficult choices, and yet the im-
perative for action, on the part of U.S. corporate actors.
10. See infra Section IV (B) of this article for a definition of the term corporate gov-
ernance and a description of its objectives, as well as a comment about the debate concern-
ing its scope and nature in a modern economy.
11. See infra Section II (B) (2) of this article for a discussion of the Kyoto Protocol.
12. See id. (describing the Kyoto Protocol and subsequent Conference of the Parties
(COP) meetings seeking to develop more fully the legal regime established by the
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol).
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II. SCIENCE AND LAW IN THE GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE DEBATE
A. SCIENCE AND THE PROBLEM; GLOBAL WARMING
AND CLIMATE CHANGE
Beyond certain basic, generally-accepted facts about climate change
lies a wealth of disagreement. Moreover, these disputes concern not
only the scientific certainty of assertions made by advocates of aggressive
action on climate change; they also extend to questions of its economic
implications and related policy decisions. This Section sets out and ex-
plores basic concepts, features and dynamics of the global climate change
debate and identifies the place of the American corporation in that
debate
So much has been said about climate change in the popular media that
many fundamental points are generally well known. Energy radiating
from the sun as short-wavelength radiation is either reflected away or
passes through the atmosphere to be absorbed by the earth. Through
complex processes of atmospheric and oceanic redistribution, the ab-
sorbed energy then radiates back toward space as long-wavelength, infra-
red energy. 13 Greenhouse gases (GHGs), including Carbon dioxide,
Methane, Nitrous oxide, Hydrofluorocarbons, Perfluorocarbons, and
Sulphur hexafluoride, emanate from the earth and settle in the atmos-
phere. 14 There, they compose a sort of blanket that "traps," or retains,
some of the infrared energy close to the earth's surface while preferen-
tially allowing in short-wavelength radiation to filter in from the sun.15
The GHGs effectively inhibit the upward passage of this energy, which
would otherwise escape more rapidly out of the earth's atmosphere.
Eventually, through an interactive redistribution process that involves ra-
diation, air currents, evaporation, cloud-formation and rainfall, the en-
ergy does in fact travel higher into the atmosphere and ultimately escapes
into space.16 The result of this delay in the escape of infrared energy is a
"warming" of the earth's surface and lower atmosphere.
Some quantum of this energy retention is beneficial, in that it warms
the atmosphere and permits the life forms and ecological systems of the
earth. 17 Too large a retention, however, upsets the "net radiative" bal-
ance between incoming and outgoing energy and thus can increase or
decrease the earth's temperature beyond normal, healthy levels:
13. Science of Climate Change, supra note 1, at 24.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Understanding
Climate Change: Beginners Guide to the UN Framework Convention, (at http://www.
unfccc.dc/resourcelbeginner.html) (updated November 2001) (describing Greenhouse
effect).
17. Id. ("This slower, more indirect process is fortunate for us, because if the surface
of the earth could radiate energy into space unhindered, the earth would be a cold lifeless
place-a bleak and barren planet rather like Mars.").
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A change in the net radiative energy available to the global Earth-
atmosphere system is termed... a radiative forcing. Positive radia-
tive forcings tend to warm the Earth's surface and lower atmosphere.
Negative radiative forcings tend to cool them. 18
While GHGs emanate from both natural sources and human-induced, or
anthropogenic, sources, it is the anthropogenic sources that are the center
of controversy.
Many scientists, environmental activists and others assert that the ever-
larger amounts of anthropogenic GHGs entering the atmosphere are
causing increasing and unacceptable levels of global warming at and near
the earth's surface. Such increases, they predict, will cause important,
and indeed, dangerous changes in the earth's climate. They speak not
only of the disruption of crucial ecosystem functions throughout the
world, but also of related adverse effects on the capacity of nations to
feed and protect their populations and to continue along their paths of
development. 19
In response to such predictions, the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO)
established in 1988 the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
(IPCC) The IPCC, drawing upon the work of experts throughout the
world, assumed the task of providing assessments of existing, reliable
knowledge about all aspects of climate change. Working Group I of the
IPCC "assesses the scientific aspects of the climate system and climate
change." °20 Working Group II "addresses the vulnerability of socio-eco-
nomic and natural systems to climate change, negative and positive con-
sequences of climate change, and options for adapting to it.' ' 21 And
Working Group III "assesses options for limiting greenhouse gas emis-
sions and otherwise mitigating climate change."'22
IPCC Working Groups have prepared three Assessment Reports on
the scientific aspects of climate change. The Third Assessment Report
"builds upon these past assessments and incorporates new results from
the past five years of climate research. '2 3 Basically, the report concludes
that increasingly reliable studies and methodologies demonstrate a pat-
18. Science of Climate Change, supra note 1, at 24. ("The amount of the radiative
forcing depends on the size of the increase in concentration of each greenhouse gas, the
radiative properties of the gases involved, and the concentrations of other greenhouse
gases already present in the atmosphere ... [some of which] reside in the atmosphere for
centuries.").
19. See, e.g., JOSEPH E. ALDY ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE: AN AGENDA FOR GLOBAL
COLLECTIVE ACTION, Oct. 2001, 3-7. (Prepared for a conference on "The Timing of Cli-
mate Change Policies," Pew Center on Global Climate Change, October 2001).
20. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, About IPCC, http://www.ipcc.ch/
about/about/htm.
21. Id.
22. Id. UNEP and WMO also established the IPCC Task Force on National Green-
house Gas Inventories, which "oversees the National Greenhouse Gas Inventories
Programme."
23. Science of Climate Change, supra note 1, at 23. The Third Assessment Report in-




tern of global warming and climate change that demands to be addressed
through a global climate change programmatic effort.
According to the report: "The global average surface temperature has
increased by 0.60 + 0.20 C since the 19th century. It is very likely that
the 1990s was the warmest decade and 1998 the warmest year in the in-
strumental record since 1861." '24
Additionally, the estimate in the Third Assessment Report of global
warming of 0.15' C higher than the estimate in the Second Assessment
Report, is mainly attributable to the "record warmth of the additional six
years (1995-2000) of data. '25 Over a longer period, the report notes re-
search indicating that the rate and duration of the warming of the 20th
century, particularly the 1990s, are greater than at any point during the
past 1,000 years. 26 The report also identified certain significant increases
in precipitation and atmospheric moisture in the middle and high lati-
tudes in parts of the Northern Hemisphere and decreasing snow cover
and land-ice. All of these changes have a positive correlation to observed
trends in global warming.2 7
Significantly, according to the report, human activities are causing in-
creases in the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases that warm
the atmosphere and, in some regions, sulfate aerosols that cool the atmos-
phere. Further, most of the observed warming of the last 50 years is
caused by human activities.28 IPCC projections indicate that the atmos-
pheric concentration of carbon dioxide will increase significantly during
the next century unless effective climate change policies are instituted. 29
Relatedly, climate models project that the Earth will warm 1.4 to 5.8' C
between 1990 and 2100.30 Precipitation will increase globally, with in-
creases and decreases locally, and an increase in heavy precipitation
events over most land areas. Increases in sea level are projected to be 8-
88cm between 1990 and 2100. Finally, climate models project increased
extreme weather events, such as heatwaves, heavy precipitation events,
floods, droughts, fires, pest outbreaks, mid-latitude continental soil mois-
ture deficits, and increased tropical cyclone peak wind and precipitation
intensities. 31
The report observes that climate change has already begun affecting
biological systems in many parts of the world, and has been reflected
most in regional temperature increases. Examples are that bird migration
patterns have been changing and birds are laying their eggs earlier. Fur-
ther, the growing season in the Northern hemisphere has lengthened by
24. Id. at 26.
25. Id. ("A secondary reason [for the higher estimate] is related to improved methods
of estimating change").
26. Id. at 28.
27. Id. at 30.
28. Id. at 55-61.
29. Id. at 65.
30. Id. at 69.
31. Id. at 72-73.
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about 1-4 days per decade during the last 40 years, and there has been
observed a pole-ward and upward migration of plants, insects, and
animals. 32
Climate change will have both beneficial and adverse effects on water
resources, agriculture, natural ecosystems and human health, although as
climate change increases in degree, adverse effects will dominate. The
magnitude and rate of climate change, as well as changes in climate ex-
tremes and variability, have a decided effect on socioeconomic sectors
(agriculture, forestry, fisheries, water resources, human settlements), ter-
restrial and aquatic ecological systems, and human health.33 In this re-
gard, the report projects problems of water availability in water scarce
regions, decreased agricultural productivity in most tropical and sub-trop-
ical regions, increased heat stress mortality and vector-borne and water-
borne diseases, increased risk of flooding, significant and irreversible
damage to some natural systems, and increased risks of extinction of
some vulnerable species.34
The report notes particularly that developing countries and their popu-
lations are especially vulnerable. 35 This is true not only because of the
sheer physical effects that climate change could inflict on their societies,
but also because of the unavailability of financial, technical and institu-
tional resources to conduct sufficient mitigation and adaptation
activities. 36
In the face of the IPCC's findings and conclusions about the science
and effects of climate change, that body points towards what it considers
to be the many technological options available to reduce near-term GHG
emissions in a cost-effective manner. At the same time, however, it notes
certain barriers to deployment of climate-friendly technology. Generally,
the reports emphasizes that stabilization through emissions reductions
must occur in all regions. A major feature in reaching this goal should be
a trend toward de-carbonization, in which different, more efficient pat-
terns of energy resource development and production, as well as its use,
must be brought to bear. Recent technical progress in the development
of alternative energy sources and technologies will be useful in this
regard.37
Further requirements for obtaining reductions are changed policies, in-
creased R&D, effective technology transfer, and reductions in market
and institutional disincentives. The use of carbon sequestration methods
can relieve some of the burden on emissions limitations in the production
process. Finally, market-based instruments are important means of ac-
32. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Climate 2001: Impacts, Ad-
aptation & Vulnerability Technical Summary, at 33-34 (2001).
33. Id. at 32-44.
34. Id. at 28-32.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 44-65.




complishing the ultimate objectives.38
Together, the IPCC Assessment Reports have provided the factual and
scientific predicate for major efforts to address climate change, including
the effort to create an international legal regime.
B. LAW AND THE SOLUTION; THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND
THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
1. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Based upon the recommendation of the IPCC in 1990, the United Na-
tions General Assembly created a committee to draft an international
treaty on climate change. 39 The Intergovernmental Negotiating Commit-
tee (INC) began its work in early 1991, in order to meet the UN's direc-
tion that the treaty be ready for signing at the 1992 United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
(Earth Summit). The INC proceeded to draft the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change 40 (FCCC).
Significantly, because of the need to gain the support of the largest
number of nations possible, the treaty model adopted, from a structural
standpoint, was one providing for great flexibility: a framework conven-
tion with provisions for protocols and annexes.411n fact, flexibility and
compromise were to be major features of the final document-indeed, of
the entire, larger law-making process-given the vast differences of opin-
ion among the national participants and the further provocative dimen-
sion added by environmental groups.
The United States expressed serious concerns in general about any ap-
proach that would be detrimental to U.S. economic interests. For exam-
ple, it steadfastly resisted the imposition of specific, obligatory targets
and timetables for reduction of GHG emissions. Additionally, because
reductions in carbon dioxide emissions would be most costly, the U.S.
insisted that the treaty focus more broadly, that is, on a "basket" of
GHGs, with flexibility to reduce non-CO2 GHGs. Further, the U.S.
wanted to promote research geared toward the development of technol-
ogy that would provide economic benefits even as it provided environ-
mental benefits.42
38. Id.
39. See G.A. Res. 45/212, U.N.G.A. 71st Plenary Meeting, A/RES/45/212 (1990).
40. For an excellent treatment of these developments, see, Donald Goldberg, As the
World Burns: Negotiating the Framework Convention on Climate Change, 5 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 239, 244 (1993).
41. Id. at 244. The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, UNEP
Doc. IG.53/5; 26 I.L.M. 1529 (1987) (signed March 22, 1985, entered into force September
22, 1988) and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 26
I.L.M. 1550 (1987) (signed September 16, 1987, entered into force January 1, 1989), pro-
vided an important example of the successful use of such a model.
42. Goldberg, supra note 36 at 244-51. See also, DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNA-
TIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 616-19 (2d ed. 2002).
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At the same time, the European Community (EC) took a much more
positive position, favoring specific emissions obligations and assistance to
support developing country participation in the process. Japan took a
similarly strong approach. 43
The developing countries, often through the leadership of the Group of
77, observed that the developed, industrialized countries have been the
major emitters of GHGs and thus the main cause of the problem. 44 Fur-
ther, they added, those developed countries have become rich and power-
ful through the very same economic activities that produced GHGs.45 On
the other hand, they noted, the developing-and not the developed-
countries stood to suffer most from the adverse consequences of climate
change.46 Therefore, in their view, it would be unfair to stifle develop-
ment in developing countries through the imposition of mitigation re-
quirements based on a problem caused by the developed countries. 47
Given these strong and disparate positions, one is not surprised that:
"The resulting Framework Convention on Climate Change was in many
ways disappointing to environmentalists, but was nonetheless a positive
step in the control of greenhouse gases."'48
Certain specific provisions illustrate the delicate-and to some, troub-
ling-balance struck between obligation and compromise. First, the ob-
jective of the FCCC is stated in its Article 2:
The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal in-
struments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve
... stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere
at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference
with the climate system.49
In pursuit of these objectives, Article 4 sets forth "Commitments" ap-
plicable to the parties. Article 4(1) imposes on all parties obligations to
study and collect appropriate data and information on climate change;
develop and implement programs directed at climate change; and cooper-
ate with one another in the various aspects of scientific investigation,
technological development, attention to social and economic implica-
tions, and public education and awareness.50
Most controversial was the imposition, in Article 4(2), of certain com-
mitments on the developed countries and countries "undergoing the pro-
cess of transition to a market economy" listed in "Annex I" of the treaty
that were not imposed on developing countries.51 These included the re-
43. Goldberg, supra note 36, at .
44. See, Paul G. Harris, Common but Differentiated Responsibility: The Kyoto Protocol




48. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 38, at 618.
49. FCCC, supra note 1, art. 2.
50. FCCC, supra note 1, art. 4(1).
51. Annex II of the FCCC consists of all the developed countries minus the transi-
tional market economy countries, i.e., Belarus, Bulgaria Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hun-
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quirement that the Annex I parties "adopt national policies and take cor-
responding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhanc-
ing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs.152 The latter provision is ac-
companied by the requirement that Annex I parties periodically submit
for review detailed information on the policies they are required to adopt
"with the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels of
these anthropogenic emissions of... [GHGs] not controlled by the Mon-
treal Protocol. ' 53 Notably, however, the power and position of the U.S.
forced the other parties to accept an agreement that omitted many impor-
tant features, including specific targets and timetables for action.
The FCCC also introduced, in Article 3, certain modern environmental
"Principles" to provide guidance in implementation of the measure.
Thus, that article institutes the concept of "intergenerational equity," by
providing that "[t]he parties should protect the climate system for the
benefit of present and future generations of humankind. '54 Additionally,
Article 3 seeks to provide for action by all parties and yet to respect the
differing degrees of capacity and culpability, especially as relates to devel-
oping countries. Hence, the article provides that the parties should act
"on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differ-
entiated responsibilities. '55
Further, Article 3 invokes the "precautionary principle" in providing
that "[wihere there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing [the
taking of cost-effective action]. ' 56 Finally, Article 3 endorses the con-
cepts of "sustainable development" and the "right to development," both
to be applied with particular regard to developing countries.57
The FCCC, along with the other Earth Summit instruments, "set[s] out
a framework of global environmental responsibilities, distinct from ear-
gary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, and Ukraine. Annex I
consists of both categories of nations.
52. FCCC, supra note 1, art. 4(2)(a). See, supra note 1, art. 1(8), defining a "Sink" as
"any process or activity which removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a
greenhouse gas from the atmosphere." An example would be a program for planting trees,
or a process for injection (or reinjection) of GHGs into geological formations. Also, Arti-
cle 1(7) defines "Reservoir" as "a component or components of the climate system where a
greenhouse gas or a precursor of a greenhouse is stored," such as the oceanic and atmos-
pheric reservoirs. The U.S. had rigorously that, in addition to emissions limitations, "en-
hancement" processes and technologies be included as an accepted mitigation approach.
53. FCCC, supra note 1, art. 4(2)(b). See also Hunter et al., supra note 38, at 619.
54. FCCC, supra note 1, article 3(1). See, e.g., EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS To
FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENER-
ATIONAL EQUITY 37-39 (1996).
55. FCCC, supra note 1, art. 3(1).
56. FCCC, supra note 1, art. 3(3).
57. FCCC, supra note 1, arts. 3 (2), (4), (5). As to all of these underlying principles, as
well as others, see generally Hunter et al., supra note 38, at 371-438, ("Principles and Con-
cepts in International Environmental Law") for an excellent discussion of the subject.
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lier concerns with merely regional or transboundary responsibilities. '58
At the same time, however, much remained for the parties, acting
through the "Conference of the Parties" 59(COP) mechanism established
by the convention, to accomplish in subsequent meetings.
At their first meeting (COP1) in Berlin in 1995, the parties determined
that stabilizing GHGs at their 1990 levels, as set forth in FCCC Article 4,
would not suffice to achieve that agreement's ultimate objectives. 60
Therefore, it would be necessary "to begin a process to enable it to take
appropriate action for the period beyond 2000, including the strengthen-
ing of the commitments of the Parties included in Annex I ... through
the adoption of a protocol .... ,,61
The Berlin Mandate required developed countries "both to elaborate
policies and measures, as well as to set quantified limitation and reduc-
tion objectives within specified time-frames... "62 for their anthropogenic
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of certain GHGs. Further,
there would be no new commitments for developing country parties. Al-
though the United States continued its pattern of stiff resistance through
several COP meetings, various internal and external pressure groups fi-
nally prevailed just before the Kyoto COP meeting: the U.S. would agree
to specific, binding targets and timetables. This set the stage for a very
important subsequent COP meeting in Kyoto, Japan.
2. The Kyoto Protocol
The COP negotiations in Kyoto were the subject of world-wide atten-
tion. The continuing disparate attitudes about climate change among the
parties, and yet the pressure that each nation did not to want to be
blamed for "killing Kyoto," made the atmosphere both lively and tense. 63
Ultimately, "[a] hastily crafted compromise put off for one year any fur-
ther discussions about developing country commitments, thus paving the
way for final adoption of the protocol. ' '64 Hence, on December 11, 1997,
the parties signed the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change.65
58. Alan E. Boyle, Book Review: Negotiating Climate Change: the Inside Story of the
Rio Convention (Irving M. Mintzer and J. Amber Leonard, Eds., Cambridge University
Press 1994), 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 864 (1995).
59. FCCC, supra note 1, art. 7 establishes the Conference of the Parties (COP) as "the
supreme body of this Convention." That article charges the COP with the review of the
implementation of the convention and authorizes it to adopt related instruments and to
make decisions that facilitate implementation.
60. Conclusion of Outstanding Issues and-Adoption of Decisions (The Berlin Man-
date), FCCC/CP/1995/L.14 (April 7, 1995).
61. Conclusion of Outstanding Issues and Adoption of Decisions (The Berlin Man-
date), FCCC/CP/1995/L.14 (April 7, 1995).
62. Id. § 2(a).
63. See Hunter et al., supra note 38, at 629.
64. Id. at 630.
65. UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Kyoto Proto-
col to The United Nations Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, FCCC/CP/1997/
L.7/Add.1 (not yet entered into effect) [hereinafter "Kyoto Protocol"].
[Vol. 55
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
Perhaps the biggest achievement of the Kyoto Protocol was the agree-
ment by the parties that the FCCC Annex I countries will meet specific,
binding targets and timetables, which the protocol calls "quantified emis-
sion limitation and reduction commitments." (QELROs) Article 3 (1)
thus provides:
The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure
that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emis-
sions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their
assigned amounts, calculated pursuant to their quantified emission
limitation and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B ... with
a view to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5
per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012.66
The "assigned amounts" represent an allowance, or permit, to emit
only so much in quantity of GHGs.67 They are calculated based on the
individualized, or differentiated, limitation and reduction commitments
(QELROs) of anthropogenic GHGs listed in Annex B of the protocol.
For example, the U.S. QELRO is 93 (%), based on the country's accept-
ance of an agreement to reduce and stabilize its GHG emissions at 7%
below the 1990 base year.68 Article 3(7) provides that the assigned
amount for each Annex I country shall be its QELRO multiplied by
five.69 This multiple specifies the allowance for each such country during
the first "commitment period, from 2008 to 2012."70
Article 2 of the protocol sets out certain policies and measures for An-
nex I countries. These include enhancement of energy efficiency; protec-
tion of sinks and reservoirs; promotion of sustainable agriculture;
promotion of renewable energy; reduction or phaseout of market disin-
centives and application of market instruments; reform of relevant sec-
tors; limitation and reduction of emissions in the transport sector; and
limitation or reduction of methane emissions. 71
Although the European Union (EU) pressed for a strong mandatory
section on policies and measures, in part to protect against competitive
disadvantages as against the U.S. and Japan, the U.S. insisted on a more
flexible provision that would allow minimization of domestic costs. The
result was an Article 2 seen by some as "not mandatory" and by others as
"weakened. '72 What the EU received instead was the right to apply the
66. Kyoto Protocol art. 3(1).
67. Kyoto Protocol art. 3(1).
68. Kyoto Protocol Annex B. Although 1990 is the general historical base year used in
the protocol, there are certain exceptions. For example, because of the limited data avail-
able on certain GHGs, Article 3(8) allows any Annex I country to "use 1995 as its base
year for hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride, for the pur-
poses" of calculating its assigned amounts. Additionally, Article 3(5) allows Annex I coun-
tries in transition to a market economy to choose alternative base years, when their
emissions may have been higher than in 1990.
69. Kyoto Protocol art. 3(7).
70. Kyoto Protocol art. 3(7).
71. Kyoto Protocol art. 2(1)(a).
72. Compare DONALD GOLDBERG, A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
(CIEL 1998) ("not mandatory"), with ABA SECION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, ENERGY
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"bubble" concept to emissions of Member States within the EU. There-
fore, under Article 4(4), the EU Member States's collective emissions ob-
ligation of eight percent below base year levels may be allocated as the
EU desires among those States.73 In effect, the EU can assign targets to
Member States in the most economically efficient manner, individually
and collectively, so long as it does not exceed the assigned amount as
calculated under the protocol.
Another area of compromise in the protocol concerns the role of land-
use change and forestry activities. The U.S. had long insisted on the right
to include reductions of GHGs through the use of sinks along with actual
emissions limitations in measuring attainment of its overall commitment.
Article 3(3) provides that "net changes in ... [GHG] emissions by sources
and removals by sinks resulting from direct human-induced land use
change and forestry activities ... shall be used to meet the commitments
in this Article . . .[of Annex I countries]. '74 (Emphasis added). On the
other hand, because of incomplete data and undeveloped methodologies
for measurement, the right to use sinks is limited to "afforestation, refor-
estation, and deforestation" 75 and does not include activities such as con-
servation, forest management, and harvesting. 76
The Kyoto Protocol also included certain market-based mechanisms
that could be used by the parties to achieve their commitments through
joint, cooperative activities. The U.S. aggressively pursued "International
Emissions Trading," which allows a party that has efficiently limited or
reduced its GHG emissions without exhausting its assigned amount to
sell or transfer remaining allowances to another party.77 "Joint Imple-
mentation" allows an Annex I party, or their private entities, to invest in
an emissions reduction or removal enhancement project in another An-
nex I party and claim a credit of such "reduction units" towards its emis-
sions limit.78 The "Clean Development Mechanism" allows Annex I
parties, or their private entities, to fund activities in developing countries.
Doing so allows them to claim "certified emissions reductions" credit for
emissions reductions in the developing country, which are usually of
AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND SUSTAINA-
BLE DEVELOPMENT, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT ("weakened").
73. Kyoto Protocol art. 4(4). See Kyoto Protocol Annex B for European Union emis-
sion obligation. Kyoto Protocol art. 4(1) provides: Any Parties "that have agreed to jointly
fulfil their commitments under Article 3, shall be deemed to have met those commitments
provided that their total combined aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent
emissions of ... [GHGs] do not exceed their assigned amounts. ...
74. Kyoto Protocol art. 3(3).
75. Id.
76. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL, supra note 63.
77. See ERIK HAITES & MALIK AMIN ASLAM, THE KYOTO MECHANISMS & GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE 3 (Box 1) (Pew September 2000): "A transfer of part of its assigned
amount by the Russian Federation to the government of Japan would be an example of
International Emissions Trading."
78. See id.: "An investment by a firm in the United States that enables a district heat-
ing system in the Czech Republic to switch from coal to natural gas and to improve the
efficiency of the system could be a Joint Implementation project."
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lower cost, in meeting its Annex I commitments. 79
Although the signing of the Kyoto Protocol represented considerable
progress, much work still remained. Many issues were left to be de-
cided-often intentionally, in order to maintain positive movement in the
process. Therefore, the COP continued to meet, attempting to complete
the picture on what remained a complex, tedious, and delicate affair. 80
However, in March 2001, newly installed American President George W.
Bush threw the process into a tailspin by announcing that the U.S. would
withdraw from the protocol. 81
After the failure of a multitude of efforts by other parties to the proto-
col to convince the U.S. to remain in the agreement, the COP-6 bis met
in Bonn, Germany in July 2001. With the U.S. more of an outsider than
ever in the process, 178 other nations adopted an agreement with impor-
tant clarifications and additions.82
For example, the Bonn Agreement establishes three new funds:
(1) A Special climate change fund, "to finance activities, program-
mes and measures related to climate change, that are complementary
to those funded by the resources allocated to the Global Environ-
ment Facility climate change focal area and by bilateral and multilat-
eral funding," in the areas of adaptation, technology transfer, energy,
transport, industry, agriculture, forestry, waste management, and as-
sistance to developing countries;
(2) A fund, to be "operated by an entity which operates the financial
mechanism, under the guidance of the.. .[COP], to support a work
programme for the least developed countries"; and
(3) A fund to "finance concrete adaptation projects and program-
mes in developing country Parties ... to the Protocol. '83
Additionally, the agreement clarified the eligible activities and pro-
vided country-specific caps for forest management in regard to the use of
sinks.84 Further, it was determined that the "mechanisms [created by the
79. See id.: "An investment by the government of the Netherlands to improve the
efficiency of a re-heat furnace in a steel plant in Thailand could qualify as a Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism project."
80. See, e.g., Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Fourth Session, Held at
Buenos Aires from 2 to 14 November 1998, FCCC/CP/1998/16, 20 January 1999. (COP 4)
Part Two of the Report contains the Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties
(Decision 1/CP.4), including the Buenos Aires Plan of Action. This plan of action was
specified in several more particularized decisions seeking ultimately to provide substantive
guidance in areas such as the financial mechanism, the development and transfer of tech-
nologies, the furtherance of measures for evaluating and responding to climate change
(with particular regard to developing countries), continuation of activities implemented
jointly under the already-established pilot phase, institution of a "work programme on
mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol," land-use and forestry issues, and other important
matters.
81. See, section Ill(A) of this Article of a discussion of the presidents actions and
rationale.
82. UNITED NATIONs FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, The Bonn
Agreement on the Implementation of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, 23 July 2001, Deci-
sion 5/CP.6, (unedited version).
83. Id. at 3-4.
84. Id. at 10-11, app. Z.
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Kyoto Protocol] shall be supplemental to domestic action, and that do-
mestic action shall thus constitute a significant element of the effort made
by each" developed country Party.85 Rules were adopted governing the
Clean Development Mechanism, including the clarification that energy
efficiency, renewable energy, and forest sink projects can qualify-but
that developed Parties should refrain from using nuclear facilities. Other
rules address the international emissions trading regime and the Joint Im-
plementation regime.86 Finally, a Compliance Committee, with a facilita-
tive branch and an enforcement branch and certain compliance rules, was
established-although specific definition of the legal character of the
compliance regime was left for later decision.87
The Parties reconvened for the COP 7 meeting in November 2001, in
Marrakech, Morocco. There, the parties "finalized the operational de-
tails of the Kyoto Protocol, opening the way to widespread ratification by
governments and the Protocol's entry into force." 88 Specifically, the Mar-
rakech Accords reflect significant progress by providing the more de-
tailed "legal" text elaborating on the more general principles of the Bonn
Agreement:
(1) Operating rules and structures for the three flexibility "mecha-
nisms," including accounting procedures, election of members of the
Clean Development Mechanism Executive Board; and, rules con-
cerning eligibility to participate in those mechanisms.
(2) Reaffirmation of the place of the compliance regime, although
political dynamics required postponement of a decision regarding
the legal character of the regime until after the entry into force of
the Protocol.
(3) Adoption of the Marrakech Ministerial Declaration, looking to-
ward the September 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Develop-
ment in Johannesburg. The Declaration highlights the linkages
between climate change and sustainable development. 89
Thus the progression continues toward implementation of an interna-
tional climate change regime. But among the many questions to be an-
swered along this path, the one regarding the role of the U.S. is perhaps
the largest. 90
85. Id. at 7.
86. Id. at 6-9.
87. See id. at 13-14.
88. PRESS RELEASE, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, GOVERNMENTS READY TO RATIFY KYOTO PROTOCOL (Nov. 10, 2001) (available
online www.unfcc.int).
89. See Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventh Session, Held at Mar-
rahesh from 29 October to 10 November 2001, at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a01.
pdf; Climate Talks in Marrakech-Cop 7: Update, Pew Center on Global Climate Change,
Nov. 9, 2001, at http://www.pewclimate.org/cop7/update-110901.cfm.
90. Indeed, at Marrakech, the United States participated in discussions, but refused to
join the other Parties in signing the Accord. See Paula J. Dobriansky, Under Secretary of
State for Global Affairs, Remarks to the Seventh Session of the Conference of Parties
(COP-7) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Nov. 7,2001),
at http://www.state.gov/g/rls/rm/2001/5969.htm. Although Japan and Russia rendered the
negotiations tedious, long and difficult, they ultimately cooperated when Japan got its wish
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III. ECONOMICS AND POLITICS IN THE GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE DEBATE
A. THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
As observed in the introduction, the United States has often taken po-
sitions on climate change in accord with those of the business community.
Accordingly, President Bush has insisted on greater scientific certainty
before expending significant resources to address the purported dangers
of climate change. 91 In so doing, he has been accused of leaving little or
no room for application of the vaunted "precautionary principle."'92 Fur-
ther, President Bush has maintained an abiding concern about energy
supply,93 equally shared responsibilities among nations,94 and other,
largely economic, considerations.95 Finally, he has expressed a prefer-
to have the ultimate decision on the legal character of the compliance regime made after
the Protocol's effective date and Russia received a large increase in the carbon sinks it
would be allowed to claim under the Protocol. See Kyoto Negotiators Reach 11th Hour
Accord; Pact Ready for Ratification by Governments, International Environment Reporter,
Vol. 24, No. 24, Nov. 21, 2001, 1009.
91. See Letter from George W. Bush, President of the United States, to Senators
Hagel, Helms, Craig, and Roberts (Mar. 13, 2001) [hereinafter President's Letter], availa-
ble at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010314.html. In that letter, Pres-
ident Bush rejects the Kyoto Protocol, offering, among several reasons, "the incomplete
state of scientific knowledge of the causes of, and solutions to, global climate change ......
See also Remarks, supra note 9, in which the president, relying upon a report of the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences, identifies several of the crucial scientific uncertainties:
[T]he Academy's report tells us that we do not know how much effect natu-
ral fluctuations in climate may have had on warming. We do not know how
much our climate could, or will change in the future. We do not know how
fast change will occur, or even how some of our actions could impact it.
92. See Hunter et al., supra note 38, at 405:
[T]he precautionary principle ... reflects the recognition that scientific cer-
tainty often comes too late to design effective legal and policy responses for
preventing potential environmental threats ....
In essence, the precautionary principle switches the burden of scientific
proof necessary for triggering policy responses from those who support
prohibiting or reducing a potentially offending activity to those who want to
continue the activity.
See also Rio DECLARATION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, U.N. Doc.A/
CONF.151/26, U.N. Sales No. 3 73.II.A.14; 31 I.L.M. 874, 879 (1992). Principle 15 provides
that "[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environ-
mental degradation."
93. See President's Letter, supra note 82, referring to "rising energy prices" and what,
in the view of the president was, "a serious energy shortage." In light of the Kyoto Proto-
col's limitations on carbon dioxide gas emissions and the predicted economic impact on
electricity prices, and considering further the energy problems confronting California and
other Western states at the time, the president found it imperative to "be very careful not
to take actions that could harm consumers."
94. See id. (stating: "I oppose the Kyoto Protocol because it exempts 80 percent of the
world, including major population centers such as China and India, from compliance...").
See also Remarks, supra note 9, in which the president notes that China is "the world's
second-largest emitter of greenhouse gases .. " and that "India and Germany are among
the top emitters. Yet, India was also exempt from Kyoto."
95. See Remarks, supra note 9, in which the president notes that: "For America, com-
plying with those [Kyoto Protocol GHG emissions limitations] mandates would have a
negative economic impact, with layoffs of workers and price increases for consumers."
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ence for "economic" or "market-based" solutions that rely heavily upon
technology development. 96 On these various points of concern and pref-
erence, the president's view has been shared in many influential places. 97
Although President Bush rejected participation in the Kyoto Protocol,
he has definitely not rejected the notion of taking appropriate action on
climate change, to the extent continued scientific inquiry appears to point
to the importance of action. Also, heavy international pressure and criti-
cism of the Kyoto Protocol rejection in particular, and of U.S. "unilateral-
ism" in general, appear to have softened at least the President's rhetoric,
if not his actual position.98 Accordingly, there is movement in the U.S.,
including governmental, business and non-governmental parties, to ad-
dress climate change issues, whether or not it ever becomes a party to the
emerging international legal regime.
B. THE POSITION OF THE AMERICAN CORPORATE COMMUNITY;
SHOULD COMPANIES STAY ON THE SIDELINES AND WATCH?
The debate-indeed, the battle-on global climate change is as fierce
as the stakes are high. The great divergence of interests among the vari-
ous participating nations and other parties is but one feature virtually
assuring continued disagreement as to the science, the economics, and
the ultimate solution. As noted in Section II (A) of this Article, some
predict dire and extreme consequences as a result of excessive global
warming. In so believing the climate change phenomenon to be a true
threat, many of them thus support the multilateral process envisioned by
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the
related Kyoto Protocol.
Others, largely within corporate and politically conservative communi-
ties, have grave doubts about many fundamental assertions typically
made by those who support binding legal commitments on climate
change. For example, they pose several key questions whose answer is
greatly dependent upon scientific verification, such as the extent of global
warming, the proportionate contribution (and hence the significance) of
anthropogenic GHG sources to the warming process, and, in any event,
96. See id.: "Our approach must be flexible to adjust to new information and take
advantage of new technology. We must always act to ensure continued economic growth
and prosperity . . . We should pursue market-based incentives and spur technological
innovation."
97. See, e.g., S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997), the Byrd-Hagel Resolution, in which the
Senate, by a 95-0 vote, expressed opposition to any climate change agreement that did not
include binding commitments on developing countries or would seriously harm the U.S.
economy.
98. See, e.g., Andrew C. Revkin, 178 Nations Reach Climate Accord; U.S. Only Looks
On, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2001, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/24/science/
24CLIM.html; Isolated on Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, (editorial) July 24, 2001, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/24/opinion/24TUEl.html; Howard Fineman, Lone
Ranger Bush Takes off His Mask, MSNBC, June 6, 2001, http://www.msnbc.com/news/
583689.asp. ("The U.S. would not sign the deal, Bush said [in March, 2001]. Well, the
administration has been slowly tiptoeing back in Kyoto's direction since, now saying it
wants to propose its own international global-warming plan.")
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whether the consequences of present global warming patterns are actu-
ally so great a threat to the world. Further, they assert that, politically,
advocacy groups supporting the existing international legal framework
unfairly favor developing nations and, more generally, distort and bolster
their claims through environmentalist hype and fanaticism.
These more skeptical participants also fear that economic growth and
productivity, and, relatedly, corporate competitiveness and shareholder
wealth, would be greatly and unnecessarily diminished by what they con-
sider to be precipitous, ill-conceived decisions to divert precious re-
sources toward climate change programs. 99
Against this complex and often confusing background, leaders in the
American corporate community must decide, first, whether there is
enough at stake to necessitate participation in the debate, and, if partici-
pation is deserved, how to participate in the context of their schemes of
corporate governance. As the next section argues, it is in the corporate
community's best interest to be a full participant. Further, some patterns
and examples of enlightened corporate governance on the issue are now
emerging, even against the backdrop of uncertainties and risks regarding
climate change in particular and those regarding the modern global econ-
omy generally.
IV. AMERICAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
A. WHO CARES? WHAT'S AT STAKE FOR THE
AMERICAN CORPORATION
What if the concerns about climate change turn out to be true? The
interests of American corporations would be among the most severely
jeopardized. Because, if, fundamentally, businesses require vibrant,
healthy markets to prosper, then major, uncontrolled events that threaten
the health, welfare and economic status of the people in a market devas-
tate that market itself. This, of course, deprives companies of opportuni-
ties to sell in those markets. Similarly, events that diminish or destroy
natural resources and their ecosystems burden and even diminish the
very base of industrial, agricultural-and ultimately, commercial and fi-
nancial-business operations. As described by the IPCC Working Group
II in producing its Third Assessment Report (Impacts, Adaptation, and
Vulnerability):
Economic sectors that support the [human] settlement [or societal
setting] are affected [by climate change] because of changes in pro-
ductive capacity (e.g., in agriculture or fisheries) or changes in mar-
99. See Hunter, et al., supra note 38, at 627 describing a mid-1990s campaign by indus-
try, the "Global Climate Information Project," in which they waged a $13 million to fight
the FCCC, often using the saying: "It's not global, and it won't work." See also Global
Climate Coalition (website), at http://www.globalclimate.org/index.htm, an industry associ-
ation that does not support the Kyoto Protocol; it stresses voluntary programs, continued
scientific inquiry, and preservation of business profitability.
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ket demand for goods and services produced there (including
demand from people living nearby and from tourism). 100
On the other hand, what if future developments reveal that the climate
change "scare" is not so great? Even under such a scenario, the magni-
tude and intensity of the debate itself necessitates leadership on the part
of the major players. Global debates can be both expensive and determi-
native of important future global dynamics. Management of the inquiry
itself, therefore, including allocation of resources expended, should be a
highly participatory event.
Whatever one thinks of the path of the global climate change debate, it
has produced a legal and political infrastructure and a growing consensus
that the climate change question must be addressed. Indeed, the fact that
178 nations gave acceptance to the Kyoto Protocol in July 2001, and that a
similarly large number supported the Marrakech Accords in November
2001, portends that national legal and economic structures in many coun-
tries, including some that would ordinarily be prime targets of foreign
direct investments, will reflect the Kyoto Protocol accords. 101
Essentially, whatever the outcome of the research into the underlying
scientific realities, the global climate change debate calls out for the best
of modern corporate governance by the American corporate community.
B. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
At the heart of corporate governance is the duty of corporate managers
to make appropriate decisions, based on their informed reading of signals
from market and other phenomena, that advance the interests of the cor-
poration and its shareholders. 10 2 Under a broader, much-contested ver-
sion of the corporate stewardship, the interests of non-shareholder
"stakeholders," or "constituencies," are taken into account by directors
in managing the company. 10 3 This latter view has not been overwhelm-
100. INTERNATIONAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 29, at 36. Especially
noteworthy is the potential impact of climate change on the financial services industry,
especially insurance companies. Id. at 38-42.
101. See infra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
102. See Ronald J. Gilson & Cheryl L. Conner, Interview: The Future of Corporate
Governance in the United States, 31 U. RICH L. REV. 1459 (1997) (interview with Professor
Ronald J. Gilson): "The [corporate governance] structure is animated by three different
mechanisms: the ... force of competition in the product or service markets in which the
corporation operates; the legal framework ... ; and shareholder direct action .. " The
GHG emissions limitations imposed on nations under the Kyoto Protocol would indi-
rectly-yet definitely and substantially-affect corporate behavior; as such, the protocol is
an example of a legal framework that would affect corporate governance.
103. Perhaps the best known, although not the exclusive examples, of the "constitu-
ency" or "stakeholder" concepts are certain provisions that appear in state corporation
codes. These provisions generally provide legal authority-and hence protection from per-
sonal liability-to corporate directors to consider the interests, not only of shareholders,
but others, such as employees, consumers, suppliers, creditors and communities, in making
certain corporate management decisions. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (b) (Mc-
Kinney's Supp. 1999). These statutory provisions reflect a specific historical development
in corporate law, and, most important, have everything to do with the deployment of de-
fensive tactics in hostile takeover attempts and little, if anything, to do with the progressive
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ingly embraced in corporate law. Nevertheless, as the discussion below
indicates, the actual practice by directors has often been different.
Increasingly, corporate managers have been recognizing that the in-
creased interdependence, as well as other features, of a modern global
economy makes it impossible simply to ignore those other constituencies,
even under a more traditional model of governance, in which those share-
holder constituencies have no place in the hierarchy of beneficiaries.
Thus, today, a corporation adopting such a model must, at a minimum,
engage employees, consumers, suppliers, non-governmental organiza-
tions, governments and others, in order to shape the economic environ-
ment and thereby enhance corporate profits and shareholder wealth.
As the current, larger debate about globalization rages, it has been
noted that "[a]t times of social protest against business, corporate govern-
ance becomes a political issue.' 04 In fact, the anti-globalization and
other recent movements not only confirm this view but they also go fur-
ther. These modern developments exacerbate the tension within the cor-
porate community and elsewhere regarding the extent to which non-
shareholder constituency interests deserve consideration in the scheme of
corporate decision making:10 5
Today, an alliance of consumer groups, socially responsible investors,
labor unions, environmentalists, and human rights activists-based
mainly in the rich countries-have begun to agitate against recent
changes in the global economy. Recognizing the difficulties associ-
ated with influencing or overturning government policy at the do-
mestic level, they have shifted their attention to multinational firms
and international organizations. These NGOs [non-governmental
organizations] have become a David battling the corporate Goliath,
extension of the scope of corporate objectives. See, e.g., DALE ARTHUR OESTERLE, THE
LAW OF MERGERS AND AcQUISITIONs 354-56 (1999).
104. Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance Listing Requirements, 54
SMU L. REV. 325, 352-55 (2001), noting that "[a]n international movement protesting
globalization has emerged to question multinational corporate activity" and discussing
some major features and institutions of the global environment that are affecting corporate
governance decisions.
105. Significant here is the fact that, overwhelmingly, the constituency provisions au-
thorize, but do not require, directors to consider a range of constituents in their decision
making processes. Further, although there has always been support for a larger, more
socially-oriented objective for the corporation, strong opposition exists within the corpo-
rate law community. In reality, it is more often than not economic, political and social
phenomena-and not corporate law-that actually drive corporate decisions to expand the
scope of the corporation's intended beneficiaries. See, e.g., William Claiborne, Toyota An-
nounces Diversity Program, WASH. POST, August 10, 2001, at E01, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A56430-2001Aug9.html, discussing Toyota Motor
Corp.'s plans to initiate a $7.8 billion, 10-year "diversity commitment initiative" to help
minorities through "procurement contracts, advertising accounts, expansion of minority-
owned dealerships, increased training and hiring of blacks and Hispanics, and other pro-
grams" for its U.S. operations. The decision came in the wake of threats by the civil rights
leader Reverend Jesse L. Jackson to stage a boycott of Toyota products because of certain




using every weapon at their disposal to make the giant stagger. 10 6
A closely related point, especially as regards the transnational corpora-
tion (TNC), is the modern view that the old, nation-state-centered model
of world politics and international law is now inaccurate, if not inappro-
priate. As Professors Keohane and Nye observe in Governance in a
Globalizing World:
The actors in world politics cannot simply be conceived of as states.
Private firms, NGOs, and subunits of governments can all play inde-
pendent or quasi-independent roles. These agents help to create or
exacerbate the dilemmas of diffusion of power, transparency, and
deadlock, afflicting international organizations. But they also play a
crucial role in governance. 0 7
One result of all these developments has been the emergence of vari-
ous international laws and norms directed at TNCs. In the environmental
area, as in others, evolving standards draw heavily upon a fundamental
fact about TNCs: "their influence on the global economy is enormous":
TNCs are key players in terms of development activity, and the per-
ception that they operate in a vacuum between ineffective national
laws and non-existent or unenforceable international laws has
heightened concerns about the current reach and effectiveness of en-
vironmental regulation, particularly where TNCs are operating in de-
veloping countries.10 8
Notably, the evolving standards vary in their source of authority,
whether "hard" or "soft" law, codes of corporate conduct or international
standards. 10 9 Hence, TNCs today encounter measures such as the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development Declaration on
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, the CERES
Principles (Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies), the
International Chamber of Commerce Business Charter for Sustainable
Development Principles for Environmental Management, the United Na-
tions Global Compact, the European Union Eco-Management and Audit
Scheme (EMAS), and the International Organization for Standardization
ISO 14000.110 No stretch of the imagination is required to envision that
106. Ethan B. Kapstein, The Corporate Ethics Crusade, FOREIGN AFFAIRS September/
October 2001, at 105, 108.
107. Robert 0. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Introduction, GOVERNANCE IN A
GLOBALIZING WORLD 22 (Joseph S. Nye & John D. Donahue eds. 2000).
108. Robert J. Fowler, International Environmental Standards for Transnational Corpo-
rations, 25 ENVTL. L. 1-3 (1995).
109. See Hunter et al., supra note 38, at 349, describing "soft law": "either 'not yet law
or not only law' . . . an important innovation in international lawmaking that describes a
flexible process for States to develop and test new legal norms before they become binding
upon the international community." See also Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the Inter-
national Law of the Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 420, 420-35 (1991); Hunter, et al.,
supra note 38, at 1409, noting, as to corporate codes of conduct, that "[t]hough no more
binding upon signatory companies than soft international law is upon signatory States, vol-
untary codes of conduct may become a marketplace requirement in certain sectors for
companies to remain competitive.




these various norms could soon embrace the Kyoto Protocol and, in doing
so, create an international marketplace in which American corporations
find themselves pressed toward conformity.
The foregoing discussion illustrates the complexity and the magnitude
of the external pressures that impose themselves on business. The ques-
tion for business, therefore, is how to negotiate these demands-and
where possible, even use them-while pursuing traditional corporate
objectives.
C. GOVERNANCE AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF INCREASING
ACTIVITY ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE
Whether it be President Bush or the conservative, industry-sponsored
Global Climate Coalition, or the World Resources Institute, all sides in
the debate are now pursuing solutions to the problem of climate change.
That is, they might be against the Kyoto Protocol and in favor of more
scientific research, voluntary (non-binding) programs, technology devel-
opment, and market-based solutions. Or, they might support the proto-
col, with its binding commitments. Nonetheless, a general direction has
been set now, and some patterns, as well as actual programs, have
emerged. Central to all these efforts is a commitment to action on cli-
mate change as an integral part of-and a positive contributor to-a com-
pany's quest for enhancement of corporate profit and shareholder value.
On the conservative side, the Global Climate Coalition has tracked,
and often supported, numerous voluntary programs on climate change
effects. In their view:
[I]t is imperative that climate policies focus on responsible voluntary
actions, including further research, innovation and deployment of
current and potential future technologies in developed and develop-
ing nations to address concerns about the climate. Unrealistic
targets and timetables, such as those called for under the Kyoto Pro-
tocol, are not achievable without severely harming the U.S. economy
and all American families, workers, seniors and children.11'
111. Global Climate Coalition, 2000 Inventory of Industry Voluntary Actions, at http://
www.globalclimate.org.
" Oil producers targeting technology strategies to reduce emissions and
making real cuts in carbon emissions through process improvements such
as highly-efficient compressors, battery-reinjection systems, steam power
from cogeneration, and the like.
* Electric utilities reducing GHG emissions by 174 million tons through effi-
ciency and process improvements.
" Coal producers increasing efficiency and reducing emissions through Clean
Coal Technology and crosscutting technologies.
" Forestry and paper industry members using improved forestry manage-
ment methods, increasing opportunities for carbon sequestration.
" The American Highway Users Alliance (truckers, automakers, tire, con-
struction, farming, etc.) addressing the issue of traffic congestion relief, in
order to reduce GHGs and other pollutants.
2002]
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Many of these programs are conducted as "public/private partner-
ships," whereby government (federal or state), industry, and non-profit
organizations combine resources and efforts on a given project.
From another philosophical perspective, the Business Environmental
Leadership Council of the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, which
includes a number of prominent multinational corporations, approaches
climate change solutions through a somewhat different matrix of beliefs:
" Accept the views of most scientists that enough is known about the
science and consequences of climate change to justify taking serious
action.
" Businesses can and should take concrete steps now to evaluate pos-
sibilities for emissions reductions, establish and pursue reduction
objectives, and invest in efficient new products, practices and
technologies.
" The Kyoto agreement represents an important first step and is a use-
ful framework for implementation and global participation.
" Progress in addressing climate change and sustaining economic
growth in the U.S. are both possible if we adopt reasonable policies,
programs and transition strategies. 112
A pertinent example of the Pew Center's work is a recent report enti-
tled Corporate Greenhouse Gas Reduction Targets. In this report:
Michael Margolick and Doug Russell of Global Change Strategies
International, Inc. provide guidance to companies contemplating
targets. Based on in-depth case studies of six diverse members of the
Pew Center's Business Environmental Leadership Council-ABB,
Entergy, IBM, Shell, Toyota, and United Technologies Corpora-
tion-the authors trace the corporate target-setting process from the
point of deciding to act on climate change, to the factors involved in
setting a target, to management and employee engagement, and to
evaluating, monitoring, and performance review.11 3
At the federal and state governmental levels, numerous voluntary pro-
grams have been instituted. Examples are the Climate Change Action
Plan 1 4 and the Technology Cooperation Agreement Pilot Project."15
On the international level, the World Bank's Prototype Carbon Fund
seeks to mitigate climate change by producing emission reductions "fully
consistent with the Kyoto Protocol and the emerging framework for Joint
112. Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Business Environmental Leadership Coun-
cil, http://www.pewclimate.org/belc/index.cfm.
113. Eileen Claussen, Corporate Greenhouse Gas Reduction Targets, November 2001, ii
(foreword), at http://www.pewclimate.org/projects-targets-forword.cfm.
114. National Partnership, Environmental Protection Agency, at http://www.epa.gov/
globalwarming/actions/national/partnership.html, stating that the Climate Change Action
Plan "is expected to produce energy savings of over $60 billion by the year 2000 and create
clean jobs for the future.
115. International-Technology Cooperation, Environmental Protection Agency, at
http://www.epa.gov/globalwarming/actions/international/techcoop/tcapp.html, describing
the project as "a means to implement Article 4.5 [FCCC] by assisting developing country
teams to define and implement technology cooperation priorities.
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Implementation . . . and the Clean Development Mechanism."'1 16 This
pilot project is a public-private partnership that provides a means by
which all stakeholders-business, government, non-governmental organi-
zations-can begin the work of refining the actual process and simultane-
ously produce real benefits. 117
These various projects and programs provide only a few examples of
the burgeoning field of active engagement, by which companies are
choosing, consistent with their own visions of corporate governance, ap-
proaches to deal with what has now come to be accepted as a real prob-
lem that needs a real solution. Moreover, these examples also provide
evidence of the vast body of resources for information and data gather-
ing, analysis, and cooperative activities. In this sense, companies can fol-
low the course typically followed by prudent companies in the relatively
uncertain periods in which a substantial and perhaps costly new regula-
tory regime might well become a reality:
(1) They track the emerging process carefully, being sure to include
in their analysis all pertinent dynamics, including political, social, ec-
onomic, and legal;
(2) They participate actively in the law-making process, as they real-
ize that they must live with the regulatory system that may eventu-
ally come into being; and,
(3) Armed with information about the nature of an approaching sys-
tem, they plan and prepare for it by making early, gradual (and thus
less costly) adjustments to corporate structure and operations.
V. CONCLUSION
The global climate change debate has attracted interest and attention
all over the world. And well it should, for it is a subject that, for all the
doubts and the reticence directed towards it, has emerged as one of the
truly important concerns of the day. Each step of the way in forging what
consensus we have today regarding the science, economics, and policies
that should prevail, has been troubled and tedious. Moreover, much re-
mains to be done in all those categories.
The American corporation's role in furthering the debate and develop-
ing solutions continues to be crucial. Given that virtually all interested
parties to the debate are in accord that technology-oriented, cost-effec-
tive, market-based solutions should be the principle means of mitigating
climate change, business has the advantage of proposed solutions framed
in a language it understands. Accordingly, more and more, corporate
leaders are stepping forward, engaging the process, and crafting solutions
that to the greatest degree possible are serving the interests of all.
116. World Bank Prototype Carbon Fund, http://www.protocypecarbonfund.org/about.
cfm.
117. See PRESS RELEASE, PRIVATE SECTOR INTEREST IN PROTOTYPE CARBON FUND
EXCEEDS EXPECTATIONS: FIRST CLOSURE INVESTMENTS REACH $135 MILLION, at http://
wblnOO18.worldbank.org/news/pressrelease.nsf.
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